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Finding a Place for the Freedom of Assembly 
George N. Russo III 
I. Introduction 
"Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable."1 
President John F. Kennedy 
Throughout American history the freedom of assembly has played a distinct role in 
affecting social change and impacting public opinion. The freedom of assembly has facilitated 
some of the most important social movements in American history: "antebellum abolitionism, 
women's suffrage, the labor movement in the Progressive Era and after the New Deal, and the 
Civil Rights movement."2 The power of assembly fought "the ideological tyranny that exploded 
during the first Red Scare in the years surrounding the World War I and the second Red Scare of 
1950s' McCarthyism."3 Abraham Lincoln once called "the right of peaceable assembly" part of 
"the Constitutional substitute for revolution."4 In the 21st century, however, the freedom of 
assembly's power has waned when it is most needed. An erosion of the activities and capacities 
of citizenship has impoverished American civic life and left our democracy at risk.5 Political 
participation has been consistently falling since the mid-1970s.6 Recent events such as the 
Supreme Court's Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision have made it even 
harder to impact our political system. Ordinary citizens cannot afford a lobbyist or significant 
political contributions. The rapidly growing inequality in American political equality and the 
ability to impact political discourse is what makes a strong freedom of assembly so important. 
1 President John F. Kennedy, Address on the First Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress (March 13, 1962). 
2 John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 Tul. L. Rev. 565, 566 (2010). 
3 !d. 
4 !d. 
5STEPHEN MACEDO ET AL., DEMOCRACY AT RISK: HOW POLITICAL CHOICES UNDERMINE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, 
AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT I (The Brookings Institution, 2005). 
6 !d. 
In the aftermath of September II, 20 II, increasing government regulation has neglected 
the freedom of assembly in the name of national security. In 2012, President Barack Obama 
signed H.R. 347: Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act of2011.7 The bill, 
commonly referred to as the "trespass bill,"8 passed through the House of Representatives with a 
vote of388-3.9 The bill updates an obscure law originally passed in 1971 by lowering the 
requisite criminal intent required to prosecute persons in restricted areas. 10 The trespass bill is 
part of a set of laws which regulate assembly and contribute to the institutionalization of political 
protest and dissentY These laws create what have been referred to as "free speech zones."12 
They are commonly used by the goverrunent to displace protesters with dissenting viewpoints. 13 
While the law does not regulate the content of people's speech, it regulates the location of speech 
and who hears the speech. However, the location of the assembly and protest is just as important 
as the content of the speech. The law diminishes the goal of assembly which is to influence 
public opinion. Despite small changes to the bill, the purpose of expanding the scope of the law 
is obvious. Similar to other free speech zones, the purpose of the amendment to the bill is to 
suppress political dissent and protest by regulating the location of assembly. 
The Supreme Court's focus on the message of the protesters instead of the act of 
assembly has diluted the power of assembly. This misguided approach allows the Court to 
analyze assembly through the public forum doctrine. The doctrine chills protest because it allows 
7 H.R. 347: Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act of2011 (On the Senate Amendment). 
Govtrack.us, (February 27, 2011), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/112-2012/h73 (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
8 Molloff, Jeanine, H.R. 347 'Trespass Bill' Criminalizes Protest, HUFFlNGTON POST, 
http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/jeanine-molloffltrespass-bill_ b _1328205.htrn1 (last visited Oct. 26, 20 12). 
'Id. 
10 Rottman, Gabe, How Big a Deal is H.R. 347, That "Criminalizing Protest" Bilf?, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION, (Oct. 26, 2012). 
11 /d. 
12 Free Speech Under Fire: The ACLU Challenge to "Protest Zones", AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, (Sept. 23, 
2003), http://www.aclu.org/free-speech/free-speech-under-fire-ac1u-challenge-protest-zones (last visited Jan. 31, 
2013). 
13 Rottman, Gabe, supra note 10. 
for the imposition of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. 14 The constitutional 
significance of assemblies lies not with the content of the speech, but instead with the act of 
assembly itself. The act of assembly presupposes that there is an actual place to assemble and be 
heard. Protests and assemblies will of course consist of speeches being made and signs being 
waved, but they are hardly the main objective of the exercise. 15 After all, most of the speeches 
are inaudible and the signs often illegible. 16 The significance of the exercise is the assembly 
itself. 17 A large public gathering forms a sense of solidarity, helps to influence public opinion, 
and sends a collective message to public officials. 18 
The Constitution recognizes assembly and speech as distinct rights. The application of 
the public forum doctrine has cast a shadow over the freedom of assembly. The doctrine needs to 
be re-conceptualized to accommodate the act of assembly and the importance of location. Laws 
such as H.R. 34 7 and other "free speech zones" contribute to the institutionalization of political 
which causes a significant erosion of the ability of the average citizen to influence public 
opinion. Analyzing political protest and assembly through the prism of free speech minimizes the 
importance ofthe act of assembly and the expressive message that it conveys. Assembly is a 
form of expressive speech that places larger emphasis on the symbolism of the assembly itself 
and its location than over the content of the message. The Supreme Court must draw a bright line 
between free speech and the expressive significance oflocation within assembly. 
Part I of this Note discusses the development of the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of the 
freedom of assembly and the history ofH.R. 347. Part II highlights the importance of assembly 
in American history. Part II-B examines the importance oflocation and ability to reach a target 
14 Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn. 103 S.Ct. 948, 956 (1983). 
15 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 Yale L.J. 978, 1016 (March, 2011). 
16 Id 
17 Id. 
1s Id. 
audience in assembly. Part II-C explores the public forum doctrine's impact on assembly. Part II-
D looks at the impact of free speech zones and how they are created. Part II-E analyzes the 
delicate balance that must be drawn between competing security interests and an individual's 
right to assemble. And finally, Part II-F proposes a bright-line rule for the Supreme Court to 
consider when evaluating freedom of assembly claims. 
Part I: Background 
The freedom of assembly, like the right of petition, was originally considered central to 
securing democratic responsiveness and active democratic citizens. 19 We now view it instead as 
simply another facet of the individual's right of free expression, focusing almost exclusively on 
the question of whether the group's message will be heard.20 This has happened because over 
time the Supreme Court has conflated the freedom of assembly with free speech. 
A. History of Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
One of the first freedom of assembly cases in Supreme Court jurisprudence is Whitney v. 
California (1972).21 Even though Whitney is classified as a free speech case, it actually focuses 
on association and assembly.22 Anita Whitney was convicted under California's 1919 Criminal 
Syndicalism Act for allegedly promoting the Communist Labor Party.23 The organization she 
belonged to was accused of advocating the violent overthrow of the government.24 The focus of 
her prosecution was not that Whitney's speech constituted criminal syndicalism, but merely that 
she belonged to an organization. 25 Speech could not have been the basis for her prosecution 
because Whitney herself had never advocated violence; to the contrary, she was on the record as 
19 Inazu, supra note 2, at footnote 250. 
20 !d. 
21 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
22 Bhagwat, supra note 15, at 983. 
23 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 366 (1927). 
24 /d. 
25 Bhagwat, supra note 15, at 984. 
supporting peaceful, democratic activism.Z6 What is significant about the majority's opinion is 
that they speak ofthe rights of free speech, assembly, and association as separate components of 
the First Amendment.Z7 The case is most famous for Justice Brandeis' concurrence in which he 
describes the statute as being directed "not at the practice of criminal syndicalism ... but at 
association with those who propose to preach it."28 Justice Brandeis also refers to the right of 
free speech and the right of assembly as distinct and coequal fundamental rights.29 
In 1937, the Supreme Court incorporated the freedom of assembly into the due process 
clause in DeJonge v. Oregon (1937).30 The Court stated that "the right to peaceable assembly is 
a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental."31 The right to 
assemble is "one that cannot be denied without violating these fundamental principles which lie 
at the base of all civil and political institutions."32 Again, in Thomas v. Collins (1945), the Court 
described, speech, press, assembly and petition as separate and distinct rights that, in 
combination constitute, "the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First 
Amendment."33 The Court emphasized that restrictions of assembly could only be justified under 
the 'clear and present danger' standard that the Court had adopted in its free speech cases."34 The 
Court in Thomas focuses on the content of the speech in the assembly. Despite referring to 
speech and assembly as distinct, the Court's application of the 'clear and present danger' test 
suggests it is primarily concerned with the speech itself. 
26 ld 
27 Jd 
28 Whitney, (Brandeis concurrence), at 372. 
29 Jd (concurrence), at 373. 
30 DeJonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
31 Jd at 364. 
32 ld 
33 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). 
34 Inazu, supra note 2, at 605. 
The Supreme Court's increasing focus on the speech of assembly has enhanced its ability 
to regulate and displace assembly under the public forum doctrine. Laws such as H.R. 347 do not 
focus on actual speech as much as where they speech is made. In Hague v. C. I. 0. (1939), the 
Court strongly emphasized the important role of public places in facilitating public discourse.35 
In Hague, the Court declared void on its face a city ordinance enacted to prevent labor meetings 
in public places and to prevent the distribution ofliterature pertaining to the organization's 
cause36 Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, declared that the "streets and parks ... have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used 
for the purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions."37 That dictum represents the foundation for modern standards regarding access to 
public properties for purposes of speech and assembly.38 Justice Roberts acknowledged the 
historical-"immemorial," "time out of mind," and "from ancient times"-intersection between 
expressive liberties and public places.39 With this dictum, the Court implicitly recognized that 
people in public places have always depending upon their ability to assemble and express their 
views.40 
The Hague Court downgraded government from "owner" to "trustee" of public land.41 
The government has a responsibility to ensure that public places are available for citizens to 
discuss matters of public concern. 42 As "trustee" of the public streets and parks, the government 
35 Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496,515 (1939). 
36 Id 
37 !d. 
38 Timothy Zick, Property As/ And Constitutional Settlement, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1361, 1401 (Fall2010). 
39 TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 184 (I" ed. 
2008). 
40 !d. 
41 !d. at 185. 
42 !d. 
is charged with maintaining such places and permitting access to them for expressive purposes.43 
Hague implied that the people had an enforceable right to be in particular places for expressive 
purposes.44 Indeed, the legal scholar Harry Kalven, Jr. read Hague as establishing a democratic 
"easement" for the people in public parks and streets, one that even permitted people to 
"commandeer" certain public places for expressive purposes.45 However, the Court also made 
clear that the privilege of a citizen to the "streets and parks for communication of views on 
national questions" is not absolute46 In short, the citizen's privilege to the streets and parks is 
just that, it is a privilege that cannot be abused. 
In Schneider v. State of New Jersey (1939), the Supreme Court expanded upon Hague by 
declaring that a city must allow speech in public places even if doing so will impose costs on the 
city47 Justice Roberts, again writing for the Court, declared "The streets are natural and proper 
places for the dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of 
his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in 
some other place."48 Justice Roberts' dictum is so important because it clearly rejects the notion 
that a city can restrict assembly and distribution of leaflets because there are other locations 
available. In both Hague and Schneider, Justice Roberts mentions "appropriate" places for 
expressive activity.49 This builds upon the idea that goverrnnent's role with respect to public 
places is more of a caretaker than an owner. 50 The goverrnnent's job was to be less about 
determining what types of expressive speech was acceptable in public places and more about 
43 SPEECH OUT OF DOORS, at 184. 
44 ld at 185. 
45 /d. 
46 Hague, at 516-517. 
47 Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, at 151 (1939). 
48 /d. 
49 DavidS. Allen, Spatial Frameworks and the Management of Dissent: From Parks to Free Speech Zones, 16 
Comm. L. & Pol'y 383, 406 (Autumn, 2011). 
50 /d. 
ensuring that citizens have access to public places to allow them to fulfill their expressive 
needs. 51 
B. The Evolution of 18 U.S.C. § 1752 
Recent history has seen a flurry of government regulation designed to manipulate the 
public forum for the purpose of displacing assembly and political protest. The most recent 
example is the "Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act of 20 II. "52 The 
law, signed by President Barack Obama in March 2012, expands an existing statute that 
criminalizes certain activity in and around areas that are restricted by the Secret Service. 53 The 
bill slightly rewrites a short trespass law, originally passed in 1971 and amended a few times 
since, that covers areas subject to heightened Secret Service security measures. 54 The bill was 
passed in the aftermath of a period of political violence in the 1960s, and lawmakers sought to 
enact legislation that would better protect American leaders. 55 The bill's purpose was to protect 
the physical safety ofthe President, and more broadly, to secure the Office of the President. 56 To 
achieve these goals, the bill extended federal protection to the President's specially designated 
"temporary residences and offices," and to "posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted areas 
where he is or will be visiting."57 Importantly, when the Senate passed the bill, they were 
particularly mindful of achieving a proper balance between the protection of the President and 
America's strong protection of free speech. 58 
51 Id. 
52 H.R. 347, supra note 7. 
53 Rottman, Gabe, Ready to Occupy? What You Need to Know about HR. 347, the "Criminalizing Protest" Law, 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/ready-occupy-what-you-
need-know-about -hr-34 7 -criminalizing-protest -law. 
54 Rottman, supra note 10. 
55 Elizabeth Craig, Note, Protecting the President from Protest: Using the Secret Service's Zone of Protection to 
Prosecute Protesters, 9 J. Gender Race & Just 665, 669 (2006). 
"Id. 
57 Id. 
ss Id. 
The recently amended bill restricts protest in three places: (I) the White House or the 
Vice President's residence; (2) a building or area where any individual under Secret Service 
protection is visiting; (3) a building or area at which a National Special Security Event (or 
"NSSE") is taking place. 59 These events can include anything from the Super Bowl to 
presidential nominating conventions. 60 The bill also grants the Department of Homeland Security 
significant discretion in designating what qualifies as one of these special events.61 The updated 
bill makes one potentially significant change, which makes it easier for the Secret Service to 
abuse lawful protesters and assemblies. Under the original statute, a person had to act "willfully 
and knowingly" when committing a crime.62 In short, you had to know your conduct was 
illegal. 63 The updated bill removes "willfully" and just requires a person to act "knowingly," 
which would mean that the person needs to know he or she is in a restricted area, but not 
necessarily that the person is committing a crime. 64 The lower intent requirement allows for 
greater prosecutorial discretion in punishing protesters in restricted areas. 
The law has the effect of creating a "free speech zone" around Secret Service designated 
areas. 65 These "free speech zones" are often used by the government to target viewpoints or to 
displace protesters from the object of their protest. 66 While the law does not expressly address 
free speech zones, the ACLU cautions that the updated law should be viewed as part of a set of 
laws that make displacing dissent easier. 67 Even though the recent changes to 18 U.S.C. § 1752 
are not groundbreaking, they signify an increasing ability of the government to control the 
59 18 u.s.c. § 1752. 
60 Rottman, supra note 10. 
61 Id. 
"Id. 
63 !d. 
64 I d. 
65 Rottman, supra note 10. 
66 Id. 
'' Id. 
location of political speech and assembly. Through regulations such as this, the government is 
using the public forum doctrine to institutionalize political protest and dissent. 
Part II. Doctrinal and Theoretical Significance of the Distinction between Free Speech and 
Assembly 
A. Importance of Assembly 
Throughout American history, street comers68, parks69, and public squares70 were the 
quintessential locales for average Americans to reach other citizens with their words. However, 
in the 21st century, partially due to the emergence of social media, the importance of location 
within the traditional public forum has diminished. For many Americans, their daily activity has 
shifted from publicly-owned to privately-owned spaces, like shopping malls, where the First 
Amendment does not apply. 71 It is becoming harder and harder for average citizens to interact 
with each other. This trend is augmented by governmental efforts to divest the public of the 
traditional public forum. 72 Increasing efforts by government officials to displace assemblies and 
protesters has created a need for a stronger emphasis on a freedom of assembly that is distinct 
from the First Amendment's protection of free speech. 
Protesters on streets throughout the country are typically dismissed by many observers. 
However, during times of heightened national security, economic downturn, or civil rights 
struggles, the United States has seen larger demonstrations with more negative externalities. 73 In 
these instances, the media will take notice. It is precisely these more widespread expressive 
messages of dissent that are the most effective ways for ordinary citizens to voice their opinions. 
68 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). 
69 Perry Education, supra note 14, at 955. 
7
° Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,766 (1995). 
71 Kevin Francis O'Neill, Privatizing Public Forums to Eliminate Dissent, 5 First Amend. L. Rev. 201, 203-204 
2007). 
72 ld at 206-207. 
73 Joseph D. Herrold, Capturing the Dialogue: Free Speech Zones and the "Caging" of First Amendment Rights, 54 
Drake L. Rev. 949, 973 (2006). 
Throughout American history, these larger demonstrations have proven successful at impacting 
public discourse and affecting social progress. 74 Justice Brandeis stated that the protection of 
political protest and dissent is essential in a democratic society: 
Freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the 
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion 
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against 
the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert 
people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental 
principle of the American government.75 
The freedom of assembly is a fundamental principle, distinct from the freedom of speech, which 
enables public discussion. 
Political equality is a key principle in democratic government and the gross inequalities 
of political influence are dangerous to our democracy.76 Political equality refers to the extent to 
which citizens have an equal voice over governmental decisions. 77 American political equality is 
expressed through one-person/one-vote, equality before the law, and equal rights of free 
speech. 78 Citizen participation is at the heart of political equality because political activity is the 
means by which citizens inform their government of their needs and preferences. 79 The freedom 
of assembly is perhaps the most effective way for citizens to induce political action. Growing 
political inequality makes it harder for citizens to influence government action and discourages 
political participation. Part of influencing the political system requires having a certain type of 
access to forums and locations. 
74 Inazu, supra note 2, at 566 (referencing claims of assembly standing against the ideological tyranny that exploded 
during the first Red Scare in the years surrounding the First World War and the second Red Scare of 1950s' 
McCarthyism). 
75 Whitney, at 648. 
76 Sidney Verba, Thoughts About Political Equality: What Is It? Why Do We Want It? 
77 /d. 
78 /d. 
79 !d. 
Expressive speech and political protest are most effective when made through the 
freedom of assembly. Indeed, the two are inextricably intertwined. The direct benefit to any 
particular person of expressing a dissenting political view is relatively slight. 80 Unless that 
person is a person of unusual power and influence, his or her individual voice is unlikely to have 
much of an impact on public opinion or government policy. 81 However, the cost of that person 
being imprisoned for his or her speech is potentially staggering. 82 Laws such as H.R. 34 7 
increase the stakes for those expressing their opinions by making assembling in certain locations 
a federal offense. Protesters are often "chilled" in their willingness to sign a petition, march in a 
rally, or speak on soapbox if doing so risks criminal prosecution. 83 Moreover, this effect is 
multiplied across society. 84 Even though many Americans may share the same political and 
dissenting views, they all may be individually "chilled" in their willingness to express their 
opinion if they fear punishment for doing so.85 The fragility of speech and assembly only further 
underscores the importance of enhancing the freedom of assembly as a means of promoting 
political equality. 
B. The Importance of "Location" in Assembly 
The current doctrinal approach to freedom of assembly and political protest is analyzed 
through a free speech lens. The two have been conflated over time where courts focus on the 
content of speech heard in an assembly.86 This misguided approach minimizes assembly to being 
a mere vehicle for enhancing speech. While every assembly contains an element of speech, the 
Court's emphasis on speech underscores the true value of assembly in a democratic society. 
80 GEOFF STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH lN WARTIME: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THEW AR ON 
TERRORISM, (page), I" ed. (2004). 
81 Id 
82 Id 
83 Id 
84 Id 
85 Stone, at.. .. 
86 Bhagwat, supra note 15, at 980. 
Assembly is a collective expressive message that only functions when assemblies are allowed to 
gather in certain locations. The most important aspect of assembly is location.87 However, 
because courts focus on the actual speech of the assembly, the public forum doctrine is applied to 
the freedom of assembly. The doctrine allows for government to displace assembly and political 
protest through reasonable, time, and manner restrictions. 88 
H.R. 34 7 is part of a series of laws that displace assembly and protesters away from a 
meaningful location. The law is not concerned with the content of speech; rather it focuses on the 
target the speech is directed toward. Under H.R. 347 and similar laws, it has become routine for 
the Secret Service to separate gatherers based on viewpoint. Protesters who refuse to confine 
their expressive speech to "free speech zones" are arrested. 89 In one instance, a "free speech 
zone" consisted of a large baseball field surrounded by a six-foot high chain-link fence and was 
located about three quarters of a mile from the presidential appearance. 90 Once inside the zone, 
protesters were not permitted to leave until the event ended.91 Furthermore, reporters were 
generally not permitted to enter the zone92 While dissenters are segregated away, those who are 
not protesting are permitted to stand within eyeshot, earshot, and camera-shot of the President93 
In another case, a protester at an airport where Air Force One landed was arrested under 18 
U.S.C. § 1752 when he refused to go to a designated "speech zone" to display a sign that said 
"No War for Oil."94 Although it was not clearly marked, the Secret Service maintained that a 
1 00-yard area surrounding the airport constituted a "secured zone."95 Despite the fact that pro-
87 Timothy Zick, Space. Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 439, 443 (2006). 
88 Perry Education, supra note 14, at 955. 
89 Your right to say it... but over there, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, September 28, 2003. 
90 SPEECH OUT OF DOORS, at 235. 
91 !d. 
92 !d. 
93 !d. 
94 !d. 
95 !d. 
administration individuals were allowed near this secured zone, the protester's conviction was 
upheld over a First Amendment challenge.96 
Political protest and dissent are forms of expressive speech that are most effective in 
public spaces, especially in places where the object of the protest is present97 Specifically, free 
speech zones take away protesters' ability to reach their target audience. The goal of these 
protests is to gain attention and impact the status quo. Assemblies want to draw attention to their 
cause and convince others of their cause. 98 The Occupy Wall Street movement proves just how 
effective the location of an assembly can be in expressing a message. The location of the 
"encampment" in Zuccotti Park in the heart of Wall Street gave life to the Occupy movement. 
The media became fascinated with the movement and it lead to Occupy protests springing up all 
over the United States.99 While impossible to prove, it seems unlikely that the Occupy movement 
would have spread so rapidly had it not been allowed to commandeer Zuccotti Park. 
The symbol and power of a location can serve as an important mouthpiece for an 
organization's message. Zuccotti Park, located in the center of the target of the Occupy protests, 
provided the perfect vehicle for the Occupy message. The first month of the Occupy Wall Street 
protest marked an obvious shift in the way the media covered the economic crisis in 2011.100 
Due to Occupy Wall Street, the media focused more on unemployment and jobs instead of the 
debt in the weeks following the debt ceiling negotiations on Capitol Hill. 101 In the last week of 
July, 2011 the word "debt" was mentioned more than 7,000 times on MSNBC, CNN, and Fox 
96SPEECH OUT OF DOORS, at 235. 
97 Thomas P. Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of "Place" in First American Jurisprudence, 75 Fordham L. 
Rev. 2587, 2588 (2007). 
98 Herrold, supra note 73, at 971. 
99 Andrew Grossman, Spreading Protests Yet to Jell, WALL STREET JOURNAL, (October 17, 2011). 
http://online. wsj .com/article/SB I 000142405297020447950457 663 505054 2416050 .html. 
100 How the 99 Percent are Changing America One News Story at a Time, THINK PROGRESS (Oct. 19, 2011), 
http://thinkprogress.org/progress-report/the-99-percent-effect-on-the-media/. 
101 Id 
News, and "unemployed" was mentioned only 75 times102 A review of the same three networks 
between October 10 and October 16,2011 during the Occupy movement, the word "debt" 
received just 398 mentions while "jobs" received 2,738 and "Wall Street" netted 2,378 103 The 
assembly was able to impact public discourse and the marketplace of ideas in the way that 
corporate spending is now able to in the aftermath of the Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission decision. That the Supreme Court has strengthened corporate speech makes it more 
paramount than ever to strengthen assembly. 
In Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes' first spoke of the "marketplace ofideas."104 
A marketplace of ideas presupposes an actual place in the public forum for ordinary citizens to 
gather and share their ideas. At a time when billions of dollars were being poured into the 2012 
Presidential Election, 105 the voice of ordinary Americans seems drowned out in the marketplace 
of ideas. Increasing government restrictions and the expansion of corporate speech threatens to 
fill the marketplace and drown out opposing viewpoints. Unable to form their own political 
lobbying group, Occupy Wall Street formed their own movement to spread their message. They 
just needed the right location. 
Restrictions on the location of assembly and speech are justified under the public forum 
doctrine due to their "secondary effects."106 Particularly with free speech zones, regulations are 
designed to prevent crime and other harmful effects that may arise from assembly. 107 However, it 
seems that by merely zoning speech to another location, speech is not viewed as being 
102 Id. 
103 !d. 
104 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 
105 Patricia Zengerle, U.S. Vote in 2012 Will Be Record, $6 Billion Election, REUTERS (Aug. 30, 2011), 
http://www .reuters.com/article/20 11108/3 0/us-usa-campaign-spending-idUSTRE77T3ZX20 II 0830. 
106 Crocker, supra note 96, at 2596. 
107 David L. Hudson, Jr. The Secondary Effects Doctrine: "The Evisceration of First Amendment Freedoms", 37 
Washburn L.J. 55 (1997) (secondary effects include: noise, security problems, residential privacy, traffic congestion, 
increased criminal activity). 
suppressed but merely relocated so as to prevent potential criminal activity. 108 While the 
prevention of crime and other negative "secondary effects" is an important consideration, the 
Supreme Court must draw a bright line rule which recognizes the importance oflocation within 
the freedom of assembly. 
C. The Public Forum Doctrine's Impact on Assembly 
The public forum doctrine's focus on the content of speech neglects the importance that 
location plays in the freedom of assembly. Part of the rationale behind the public forum doctrine 
is that because there are so many other places or venues for speech, the government can 
reasonably restrict access to those places it designates as non-public. 109 However, the real query 
for the freedom of assembly should be whether there are adequate places to assemble. Assembly 
is not speech. Assembly is entirely dependent upon having a place in public to gather and 
assemble. While the content of the assembly's verbal communication is undoubtedly part of 
every assembly, the larger expressive message of assembly is dependent upon location and 
access to the public. 
A significant number of public forum cases in the Supreme Court have not involved 
individual speakers seeking access to government properties. 110 Instead, they have involved 
groups wanting to use government property and public land to assemble, recruit, and send a 
collective, expressive message to the public or government officials. 111 Hague and Schneider 
both involved groups gathering on public land for the purpose of reaching other people. The 
passing ofliterature in Schneider would not be effective if the assembly was designed to a less 
populated area of the city. Assembly is dependent upon location and access to specific audiences. 
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Initially, the concept of the public forum was intended to be speech protective.112 Whether the 
concept was intended to establish a system of categorizing public property in order to define 
access rights for expressive purposes is less certain. 113 However, over the past fifty years, the 
Court has traveled a winding course that has ultimately led to its current articulation of a doctrine 
that has attracted widespread criticism and concern among legal commentators and among 
various Justices. 114 The Court's application of the public forum doctrine to assembly allows it to 
displace political protest and take away its effectiveness. 
Part of the rationale behind the public forum doctrine holds that, because there are so 
many other places for speech, the government can restrict access to certain places it designates as 
"non-public."115 The Supreme Court's focus on the content of speech instead of the actual 
location of the assembly has led to a weaker freedom of assembly. To express a message of 
political protest or dissent is to attempt to reach new audiences and the object of the protest. No 
expressive message is made when the object of the protest cannot see or hear the assembly. 
Recent regulation has targeted the elimination of the dissenters' ability to appear as dissent to 
specific audiences. 116 Preventing groups from appearing as dissent has led to the increasing 
reliance on free speech zones as a way of protecting public order and promoting security. 
D. Creation of Free Speech Zones 
The Supreme Court's application of the public forum doctrine to the freedom of assembly 
enables government officials to create "free speech zones" around important locations and 
audiences. The primary aim of a free speech zone is to control the location of public expression 
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of opinion. 117 These regulations are routinely permitted if they are reasonable time, place, and 
manner restrictions. 118 A government regulation is permitted if it furthers an important or 
substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression; and if the incidental restriction of alleged First Amendment freedom is no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 119 Free speech zones are difficult to 
challenge because the concept of a free speech zone is too amorphous for a court to rule on in the 
abstract. 120 Regardless of their motives, most assemblies confined to free speech zones are there 
to express their viewpoints with the intention of changing the minds of others. 121 Denying these 
individuals access to their target audience denies them the ability to participate in public 
discourse. 122 These protesters are forced to find less conducive locations and methods to express 
their message. 
The rationale behind the acceptance of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions is 
that courts assume there are other places for people to express their message. 123 However, that is 
not always the case. Courts have classified "spatial restrictions are unrelated to expressive 
content."124 These restrictions are "treated as inarguably rational means of serving governmental 
interests such as maintaining order and security."125 Free speech zones render protest ineffective 
by forcing protesters away from their target audience. The restrictions on the location of 
assembly contribute to the institutionalization of political protest and dissent. 
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The main problem posed by free speech zones is that the way in which they are enforced 
can effectively censor those wishing to exercise their liberty. The public forum doctrine's 
allowance of reasonable content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions is problematic when 
entire mediums of communication are prohibited by government regulatory action. 126 Even if 
such zones are applied to all persons regardless of the nature of their expressive activity, if the 
zone effectively silences communication, it should be found unconstitutional.127 These protesters 
are barred from entering the marketplace of ideas. While audiences cannot be forced to listen to 
assemblies, to be a valid time, place, and manner restriction, the regulation of assemblies should 
provide the assembly with an opportunity to reach their intended audience, irrespective of 
whether the audience actually listens. 128 Free speech zones can effectively censor dissenting 
viewpoints and limit public debate and restrict the spread of ideas. 129 
Institutionalization refers to the methods that are used to police and regulate political 
protest and dissent. Fear of police crackdowns on demonstrations and protests has led to entire 
public events being stage-managed from their inception, with protesters willingly negotiating 
every detail with officials except, of course, the actual content of their message. 130 This type of 
control over assemblies and protests defeats the entire purpose. The goal of the assembly is to 
influence public debate and interact with others. 131 The goals and objectives of assembly cannot 
be achieved when assemblies are forced to negotiate ahead of time with the very same people 
they are protesting. 132 When the Secret Service is allowed to designate protesters into "free 
speech zones" and regulate them away from political conventions or politicians then they are 
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unable to enter the marketplace. 133 The Hague dictum purported to reject the ownership principle 
and to place the public streets and parks under the protection of a public trust. 134 Layer upon 
layer of permit and other time, place, and marmer regulations has resulted in a system in which 
government officials can use their discretion to filter what information enters the marketplace. 135 
Whether an assembly seeks to gather outside a political convention, near a presidential 
speech, or in the heart of Wall Street, it is likely to be restricted by expressive zoning. Today 
speakers must navigate a gauntlet of official "demonstration zones," "free speech zones," 
"buffers," "bubbles," "cages," and "pens."136 These types of free speech zones fundamentally 
alter the relationship between the traditional public forum and dissent. 137 The concept of place 
was built on the importance of protecting individual speech, but also on the ability of citizens to 
gain access to different ideas within the marketplace. 138 It was for that reason that Justice Roberts 
claimed in Schneider that it was unconstitutional to prohibit speech simply because it could be 
exercised in some other location. 139 In every free speech zone or demonstration zone there is the 
suppression of political speech through allegedly content-neutral regulation of the public 
forum. 140 The goal is being able to strike the proper balance between the negative secondary 
effects of speech and our First Amendment protections. 
Many laws, including H.R. 347, contribute to the institutionalization of assembly through 
the significant discretion offered to government officials. They allow allegedly content-neutral 
restrictions to have a selective effect on the speech of political protest. 141 For instance, the "free 
133 Id. 
134 Id 
135 Id 
136 ld at61. 
137 Id 
138 DavidS. Allen, supra note 49, at 420. 
139 ld. 
14o Id 
141 Garry, supra note 106, at 479. 
speech" zones set up by the Secret Service to shield the President are not directed toward 
supporters, who are often granted closer access to the President, but instead to protesters who are 
kept at a significant distance. 142 Legal scholar Timothy Zick has lamented the negative impact 
free speech zones and other "spatial tactics" have on political dissent. 143 Insofar as the success of 
political and social movements depends on things like freedom of movement, ease of assembly, 
and spontaneous expression, these tactics present substantial obstacles. 144 They separate speakers 
and listeners in public spaces and they facilitate listener avoidance of expression that is 
presumptively offensive or dangerous, a presumption arising from official displacement. 145 
Listeners are "protected" not only from speakers, but from their message as well. 146 In the course 
of protecting itself and its officials, the government is driving protest into comers and placing it, 
quite literally, in pens and cages. 147 This type of displacement will continue to be upheld by the 
courts so long as the government can identify a credible and content-neutral interest in 
maintaining this separation. 
Courts, such as the First Circuit in Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston, 148 have routinely 
upheld free speech zones in the name of security. Despite the district judge likening the 
demonstration zone to an "internment camp,"149 the First Circuit upheld the prison-like zone. 150 
In its defense of the zone, the Secret Service presented information ex parte concerning "specific 
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intelligence concerning security threats." 151 The Judge's decision was based solely on "past 
experience at comparable events, including the 2000 DNC in Los Angeles."152 On appeal, the 
First Circuit found that the security measures imposed "a substantial burden on free expression," 
noting lack of physical interaction with delegates, direct limitations on aural communications, 
and impaired visual communication with signs or other media by the cramped space and meshed 
screening. 153 In upholding the demonstration zone, the court reasoned that "the quantum of 
'threat' evidence was sufficient to allow the trier to weigh it in the balance."154 The deferential 
standard employed by the First Circuit in upholding the monstrous demonstration zone further 
highlights the necessity of a bright line rule to protect the freedom of assembly. 
E. Balancing the Competing Security Interest Versus Assembly 
The displacement of dissent and political protest at presidential appearances and national 
conventions provides the greatest contrast of the competing interests of the government's 
security interest and the freedom of assembly's expressive messaging. While such laws intend to 
protect the President and others under Secret Service protest, they also separate protesters based 
on their dissenting viewpoints. Such regulations would be presumptively unconstitutional as 
content-based discrimination on speech. 155 However, these free speech zones are consistently 
upheld because the security interests trump the First Amendment in these instances. There is a 
long history of free speech zones being used to discriminate against those expressing dissenting 
views. 156 It does not take much to draw the attention of the Secret Service. There are widely 
reported instances of protesters being removed for wearing opposing shirts and buttons, holding 
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up signs, and even silent protesting. 157 The recent amendments increasing prosecutorial 
discretion through H.R. 347 make the application of these laws even more troublesome. 
H.R. 347 gives the Secret Service discretion in developing restricted areas around certain 
specially designated events. The Secret Service can declare an event a "National Special Security 
Event" which enables them to increase security and use greater discretion. However, courts must 
evaluate both the government's security interest and the method used to further that interest in 
order to determine its constitutionality. 158 The increased power granted to the Secret Service also 
means there is a greater possibility for abuse of that power at the expense of the First 
Amendment. 
Courts have overlooked restrictions in the form of "demonstration zones" or "cages" at 
political conventions such as the Democratic National Convention in 2004. 159 The 
Demonstration Zone ("DZ") was a cage which barricaded and fenced in protesters outside of the 
Fleet Center in Boston. 160 To keep anyone from climbing out, there were two layers of thick 
mesh added to the fences and coiled razor wire at its apex.161 With National Guardsmen closely 
watching the pen, protesters were not allowed to leave, would have no meaningful access to the 
delegates, and were forbidden from passing out leaflets or other materials. 162 A federal judge 
described the DZ as an "internment camp" which was "a symbolic affront to the First 
Amendment." 163 Despite the federal judge's strong criticism, both the trial and appellate courts 
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upheld the use of the DZ due to "security" concerns. 164 Not a single protester ever decided to 
enter the DZ. 165 
Events like the DZ at the 2004 Democratic National Convention demonstrate the delicate 
balance that needs to be struck between assembly and security concerns. The security 
precautions were so intense that protesters expressive message was muted because they refused 
to enter the DZ. The obvious goal ofthe protesters was to influence the discussion that was going 
on inside of the Convention. Troublingly, the First Circuit reasoned that, "although the 
opportunity to interact directly with the body of delegates by, say, moving among them and 
distributing literature, would doubtless have facilitated the demonstrators' ability to reach their 
intended audience, there is no constitutional requirement that demonstrators be granted that sort 
of particularized access."166 The court dismissed the importance of the assembly's location by 
stating the "messages expressed beyond the first-hand sight and sound of the delegates 
nonetheless have a propensity to reach the delegates through television, radio, the press, the 
internet, and other outlets."167 The court completely ignored the significance of location. 168 
Location creates a more effective medium for expressing a message, but the court failed to 
consider that not all locations are interchangeable. 169 The protesters would have no chance of 
influencing the media's coverage of the Convention from inside the "internment camp." 
Part of maintaining order around these events also includes protecting those who wish to 
exercise their First Amendment liberties. The government should be just as concerned with 
protecting the individuals within free speech zones as they are with protecting the group, 
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location, or important official that justified the zone in the first place. 170 Those exercising their 
First Amendment liberties are exposed to the same threats and dangers as those outside the free 
speech zone but they lack the same ability to act to ensure their own safety .17l If the alleged 
security interests are enough to warrant the creation of free speech zones, then surely they are 
enough of a threat to ensure the protection of those Americans seeking to express their views. 
In the 21" century and the age of terrorism, there is clearly a strong need to protect 
American leaders and public officials. However, that interest must be balanced against the goal 
of giving a voice to the minority in a democratic society. These expressions of political protest 
through assembly have always served as a check on political power in American history. 
Regulations designed to restrict dissenters away from their audience are well-intentioned. 
However, displacement can and often does immobilize protest, mute-speakers, and distort their 
messages. 172 The architecture of free speech zones does those things. They prevent movement, 
facilitate surveillance, and prohibit certain forms of expression. 173 Restrictions on assembly and 
political protest literally capture dissenting and sometimes unpopular views in cages. In the 
coming years it will be increasingly important to liberate the freedom of assembly from the 
backdrop of free speech within the First Amendment. 
F. The Supreme Court Must Create a Bright Line Rule 
In order to rescue the freedom of assembly from being captured by the public forum 
doctrine, the Supreme Court must place greater emphasis on the act of assembly and the location 
in which assembly takes place. The Court's focus on the speech of an assembly allows for the 
government to create free speech zones and prevent assemblies from reaching their target 
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audience. There's no question that the primary rationale behind expressive zoning is to maintain 
security and public order. 174 A government imposed free speech zone is unnecessary in most 
events because authorities can adequately maintain crowd control and detain anyone who 
becomes violent or disruptive. 175 The government should take great care to make certain that free 
speech zones are used only when warranted by the circumstances so that free speech zones are 
the exception, and not the rule, for regulating First Amendment expression in public. 176 
Free speech zones constraint the only method ordinary Americans have at making their 
voices heard. In the wake of Citizens United, unprecedented corporate spending is now allowed 
to fill the void left by a weakened freedom of assembly. These Americans cannot afford 
lobbyists or Super P ACs. There is a strong associational expression that comes when protesters 
join other likeminded protesters in expressing their message en masse. 177 These are people who, 
individually, are without sufficient means to impact the public discourse. The importance is 
growing to provide greater assembly protection to allow the minority a voice in to compete with 
expanding influence that corporations and special interests have on speech. Not only can 
government restrictions create free speech zones to constrain minority viewpoints, cash-heavy 
lobbyists can also drown out opposing viewpoints. A stronger freedom of assembly is needed in 
order for dissenting viewpoints to combat increasing government restrictions and corporate 
spending. 
The Supreme Court must liberate the public forum in order to allow for ordinary citizens 
to occupy traditional places to express their messages. Instead of being preoccupied with 
alternate areas to speak, the Supreme Court should ask itself whether there are alternate places to 
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assemble and reach the target audience. This type of bright line rule creates a distinction between 
two different and coequal fundamental rights. Displacement of protesters far out of sight from 
their audience takes away the incentive for dissenters to speak their voice. In a democratic 
society it is critical that citizens be allowed to express their views, especially when those vies are 
in the minority. 
The Supreme Court must acknowledge the important role that location plays in the 
expressive message of an assembly. While it is impossible for the Court to create a bright line 
boundary restriction due to the fact-intensive nature of each inquiry, the Court must ensure that 
the communication of the assembly is not curtailed. 178 When assemblies cannot be seen, heard, 
or otherwise exchanged the free speech zone's restriction on speech violates the First 
Amendment.179 The freedom of assembly needs a rule which protects expressive messages of 
assemblies and allows that message to reach its target audience. The ability for the target 
audience to see speakers in order to ascertain that efforts are being made to communicate with 
them should be a requirement for the imposition of a free speech zone. 180 Segregating an 
assembly away from the object oftheir protest is effectively filtering what information and ideas 
are allowed to enter the marketplace. Deciding which ideas are appropriate is not the job of the 
govermnent but is a decision for those individuals in the marketplace. 
The Court should require a heavy burden on the govermnent to justify such restrictions. 
The govermnent must present evidence that alternate areas near the target audience were 
contemplated. The government must not be able to blindly rely on the broad shield of national 
security. Having protesters file into demonstration zones and cages under the vague threat of 
national security and public order suppresses the freedom of assembly and dilutes the 
178 Herrold, supra note 73, at 989. 
"' Id. 
180 Herrold, supra note 73, at 989. 
marketplace of ideas. The Court should require that actual locations for protest were accounted 
for but that they ultimately proved unworkable. 
Conclusion 
The time has come for the Supreme Court to liberate the freedom of assembly from the 
shadows of free speech doctrine. In today's society, it is becoming increasingly important for 
ordinary Americans to express their feelings. Movements and political protests around the 
country and throughout history prove that assembly is the most effective method of expressive 
communication. The Supreme Court's focus on the content of an assembly's message instead of 
the expressive act of assembly has weakened this fundamental First Amendment right. This 
focus on the speech aspect of assembly confuses the freedom of assembly with freedom of 
speech. This allows for the government to impose reasonable content-neutral restrictions on 
assemblies. Government officials are permitted to displace assemblies while not regulating their 
actual speech. This displacement weakens the significance of location within the freedom of 
assembly. 
Freedom of assembly doctrine must acknowledge the importance of location. The 
expressive significance of assembling in a certain location is what makes assembly so effective. 
Courts have allowed the government to regulate assembly far away from its target audience so 
long as there is another place for the assembly to speak its message. This approach distorts the 
actual purpose behind the assembly. Individuals who join in an assembly are there for the 
purpose of expressing their viewpoints with the intent to change the minds of others. 181 
Regulations which confine assemblies into free speech zones filter the assembly out of the 
marketplace of ideas. Assemblies must be afforded the ability to reach their target audience. 
Without access to its intended audience, the assembly is without a purpose. 
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The main purpose of assembly is not the content of its speech but the assembly itself. 
Analyzing the freedom of assembly through the public forum doctrine ignores the key distinction 
between assembly and speech. The deferential standard granted by the courts allows reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions to displace assembly from its target and weakens this First 
Amendment liberty. Without access to its target audience, the members of the assembly are 
dissuaded from expressing their opinions and the marketplace of ideas is diluted. The location of 
the assembly allows for a strong connection to form between the members of the assembly and 
helps influence public opinion. The Supreme Court must draw a bright line distinction between 
the freedom of assembly and free speech. 
